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•  Financial stability does not exist in the absence of 
the right institutions 
•  In building those institutions general law might 
have to be amended/reformed or just ignored 
•  E.g., banks require special insolvency laws which 
not only bypass general insolvency law but also 
ignore shareholder rights grounded in general 
company law 
•  Without new International law-based supervisory 
and policy structures international banking will 
become a thing of the past sooner or later 
 
What’s the connection with the theme of 
the conference? 
Emilios Avgouleas 18/04/2013 
What else? 
•  Another theme of the conference is building the 
right financial structure for a more equitable and 
stable economy? 
•  How? 
•  By reconceptualizing what banks and different 
forms of banking are all about? 
•  Can the international dimension be ignored and 
what reforms are required in the global financial 
architecture? 
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 •  VOLCKER RULE: BAN ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & 
INVESTING SPONSORING SHADOW BANKING FUNDS 
•  SIZE LIMITATIONS: Cap on assets/liabilities (Dodd-Frank 
cap very lax) 
•  STRUCTURAL  REFORMS – e.g., UK’s ring-fencing 
•  CAPITAL SURCHARGES: ‘a progressive Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5%, 
depending on a bank's systemic importance. To provide a 
disincentive for banks facing the highest charge to increase 
materially their global systemic importance in the future, an 
additional 1% loss absorbency would be applied in such 
circumstances.’ (Basel Committee, 2011) 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REFORMS 
PREVENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FROM 
BECOMING TOO BIG 
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But	  how	  about	  structural	  reform?	  
•  Other than the S&L debacle of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, which saw 747 thrift failures (out of 
3,234) but had nothing to do with failures of 
individual systemic financial institutions, the US 
suffered no material financial setbacks during the 
separated-banking era. An exception was the 
1984 failure of Continental Illinois Bank and Trust 
Company. 
•  A consequence of Glass-Steagall may have been 
the progressive dominance of US investment 
banks in rapidly evolving offshore and onshore 
capital markets worldwide.  
Emilios Avgouleas 18/04/2013 
Glass	  Steagall’s	  success	  
Focus	  ma7ers!	  
•  The US investment banks’ global offensive was 
so successful that virtually all the major 
universal banks in Europe launched ambitious 
efforts to develop investment banking divisions 
of their own.  
•  By the early 1990s American investment banks 
basically dominated their industry world- wide, 
with a market share approaching 75% in terms 
of transactions volume. As a consequence, 
investment banking developed into one of the 
top US export industries.  
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So	  are	  the	  obstacles	  to	  structural	  reform	  real?	  
•  Scant	  evidence	  of	  true	  economies	  of	  scale	  a7ached	  
to	  large	  bank	  size	  
•  DiversiﬁcaAon/conglomeraAon	  increases	  agency	  
conﬂicts	  within	  the	  bank	  and	  destroys	  value,	  
although	  diverse	  income	  streams	  do	  give	  the	  bank	  a	  
more	  stable	  income	  base	  
•  The	  diversiﬁcaAon	  discount	  means	  that	  
shareholders	  probably	  get	  a	  worse	  deal	  to	  what	  
they	  would	  be	  geHng	  if	  each	  major	  line	  of	  
operaAons	  was	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  business	  
Emilios Avgouleas 18/04/2013 
Laying	  out	  the	  business	  case	  for	  smaller	  and	  
more	  focused	  banks	  
•  Smaller banks are much better placed than larger 
banks to produce and utilize critical soft information 
that is often an excellent way to judge creditor quality 
alongside hard data that is of course available to both 
large and smaller banks.  
•  Larger, more centralized banks base their credit 
approval decisions more on hard (verifiable) 
information, whereas smaller (more decentralized) 
banks can more easily use soft information. 
•  As a consequence relationship banking could suffer. 
This might be particularly important for the financing of 
smaller and informationally opaque firms, and also has 
implications for the optimal decision-making structure 
of larger financial institutions (see Stein, 2002; Liberti, 
2003; and Strahan, 2008 
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A	  New	  Model	  for	  Structural	  Reform?	  
•  But	  even	  if	  the	  ﬁnancial	  stability	  and	  fostering	  of	  
ethical	  behaviour	  raAonales	  are	  more	  than	  enough	  
to	  jusAfy	  structural	  reform,	  where	  do	  you	  set	  the	  
boundary?	  
•  EssenAally	  we	  have	  three	  disAnct	  banking	  business	  
models	  (Lewellyn	  2011)	  
•  Retail,	  savings,	  and	  loans	  
•  Wholesale	  lending	  
•  Investment	  banking	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Is	  there	  an	  eﬀec=ve	  alterna=ve	  	  
to	  structural	  reform?	  
•  Ownership restrictions 
•  Since diffuse ownership diminishes 
corporate governance monitoring incentives 
and fosters short-termism 
•  Either big banks turn into stakeholder owned 
banks 
•  Or restrictions are placed on short-term 
shareholders which means that only the 
state and pension funds could become bank 
shareholders 
•  These ought to be seen as intolerant 
restrictions in a capitalist society 
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Is there a need for a (formal) global governance 
system for International Finance? 
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YES 
•  BECAUSE GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND 
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL FLOWS CANNOT BE PROPERLY 
MAINTAINED IN THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURES AND 
INSTITUTIONS SAFEGUARDING SYSTEMIC STABILITY 
•  RELIANCE ON PERFECT MARKETS WAS A COSTLY 
ILLUSION  
•  BUT CANNOT HAPPEN WITHOUT A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY IN THE FORM OF BRETTON WOODS OR WTO 
 
 
FOUR AREAS OF TREMENDOUS CONCERN 
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l Effective supervision and monitoring of systemic risk  
in global markets, esp. risk originating in the shadow banking 
sector 
l Effective supervision of big cross-border institutions, 
so-called Globally Significant Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) 
l Effective understanding and management of risk  
in the financial sector, esp. risk attached to financial innovation, 
and standard production  
l Effective resolution of cross-border financial institutions(G-
SIFIs), and more importantly of cross-border financial groups.  
Global Policy Issues 
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A global governance system for international finance has to 
also redress a number of shortcomings enshrined in the 
current soft law based approach: 
l Legitimacy/accountability 
l Effectiveness 
l Over-reliance on the private sector 
l Address the development/poverty eradication and 
sustainability objectives 
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Let's for instance examine the issue of shadow 
banking 
Essentially this quote from a recent speech by BoE's Paul 
Tucker encapsulates the situation in global markets: 
'But it is also true that anyone holding a securities 
portfolio can build themselves a shadow bank using the 
securities lending and repo markets. One simply lends out 
the securities at call for cash, and then one employs that 
cash …' 1 
 
1. Paul Tucker, 'Shadow banking: thoughts for a possible policy agenda' 
Speech given by at the European Commission High Level Conference, Brussels, 
27 April 2012 
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The Securities Lending Chain 
Source: Interim Report of the FSB Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos 
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These short-term cash flows: 
l  First, intensify asset bubbles (not causing them, 
asset bumbles are probably the result of loose 
monetary policies, global trade imbalances, and 
irrational exuberance); 
l  Second, might inflate commodity prices and distort 
forex markets. 
l  Distorted commodity prices and exchange rates 
are seen factors that hinder the stability and 
development of international trade 
l  In addition, inflated commodity prices intensify 
global trade imbalances in favour of commodity 
exporting countries 
The Macro-prudential supervisor 
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The first pillar, the global systemic risk (macro-prudential) 
supervisor that would monitor both macro-economic 
developments and the state of the global financial system, seen 
as encompassing national and regional financial systems and the 
shadow banking sector, should comprise a revamped IMF. 
The entanglement of financial sector stability and solvency with 
sovereign indebtedness and vice versa means that only a 
revamped IMF could effectively discharge the duties of a global 
macro-prudential supervisor.  
Micro-prudential Supervisor 
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The micro-prudential supervisor could exercise 
direct oversight over G-SIFIS, whether banks or 
other financial institutions, such as insurance 
companies, with a large cross-border asset or 
liabilities base. It remit could gradually extend to 
cover certain wholesale segments of global 
derivatives and securities markets 
 
Global Financial Policy and Knowledge Supervisor 
 & A Global Resolution Authority 
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•  The third pillar should comprise the OECD and the research ‘division’ 
of BIS and should be dedicated to the task of production of new 
regulation and examination/evaluation of emerging risks, especially by 
means of various financial innovations. The new body could be called 
the Global Financial Policy, Regulation, and Knowledge Organisation 
and should be the directing mind of International financial regulation. 
•  The fourth pillar should comprise a newly established Global Resolution 
Authority which should be strictly dealing with the resolution of big 
cross-border financial groups on the basis of a single resolution and 
insolvency model. 
 
 
A General Principles/Shared Values Framework 
Emilios Avgouleas 18/04/2013 
 
 
I view three principles as beyond dispute:  
(a)  safeguarding the global public good of financial stability,  
(b)  protecting the robustness of financial infrastructure,  
(c)  safeguarding the integrity of global markets and protecting 
investors and consumers of financial services from abusive 
practices and products.  
(d)  To these principles I would a add a fourth, even though, it may 
only be seen as a supplement to the principle of financial 
stability. All actions of the new system should be cognizant of 
their impact on the ability of open and competitive financial 
markets to foster economic growth and reduce poverty, when 
the objective of financial stability is not compromised. 
 
  
 
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  of	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Proposal	  by	  Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  
Governance	  of	  Global	  Financial	  
Markets	  (2012)	  
A Global Passport? 
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•  WTO signatories would have to agree to a 
modification of GATS that renders the ‘prudential 
regulation carve out’ inapplicable for financial 
institutions governed by the proposed governance 
scheme.  
•  This should not prove an insurmountable problem, 
since with the scheme authorities taking important 
steps to safeguard systemic stability further 
liberalisation of global trade in financial services 
should be able to return to the WTO negotiations 
agenda.  
 
BUT SURELY THERE IS NO PRECEDENT? 
WELL NOT QUITE 
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THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION SHALL COMPRISE: 
1. A Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which will 
extend to all 6,000 eurozone banks 
2.The SSM will be followed by a common bank 
recapitalisation policy and fund,  
3. a single resolution mechanism and,  
4. ultimately, a single deposit insurance scheme. 
 
 
 
